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Abstract
The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of
contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that
we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how
we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain
very different set of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non–trivially, if
we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that
stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the
maximal number of players contributes.
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1

Introduction

In this paper we consider a stylized game of contribution to a discrete local public good
where the range of externalities is defined by a network. With a small probability players
may fail to play their best response and we analyze which equilibria are most stable to such
errors. In particular, we show that the nature of the mistake has a fundamental role in
determining the characteristics of such stable equilibria.
Let us start with an example.
Example 1. Ann, Bob, Cindy, Dan and Eve live in a suburb of a big city and they all have
to take private cars in order to reach downtown every working day. They could share the
car but they are not all friends together: Ann and Eve do not know each other but they
both know Bob, Cindy and Dan, who also don’t know each other. The network of relations
is shown in Figure 1. In a one–shot equilibrium (the first working day) they will end up
sharing cars. Any of our characters would be happy to give a lift to a friend, but we assume
here that non–linked people do not know each other and would not offer each other a lift.
No one would take the car if a friend is doing so, but someone would be forced to take it if
none of her/his friends is doing so. There is a less congestioned equilibrium in which Ann
and Eve take the car (and the other three take somehow a lift), and a more polluting one in
which Bob, Cindy and Dan take their car (offering a lift to Ann and Eve, who will choose
one of them).
Bob

Ann

Cindy

Eve

Dan

Figure 1: Five potential drivers in a network of relations.
Imagine to be in the less congestioned equilibrium. Now suppose that, even if they all
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agreed on how to manage the trip, in the morning Ann finds out that her car’s engine is
broken and she cannot start it. She will call her three friends, who are however not planning
to take the car and will not be able to offer her a lift. As Ann does not know Eve, and Eve
will be the only one left with a car, Ann will have to wait for her own car to be repaired
before she can reach her workplace. Only if both cars of Ann and Eve break down, then
Bob, Cindy and Dan will take their cars, and we will shift to the inefficient equilibrium. It
is easy to see that if we start instead from the congestioned equilibrium, then we need three
cars to break down before we can induce Ann and Eve to get their own. In this sense the
bad equilibrium is more stable, as it needs a less likely event in order to be changed with
another equilibrium. 
In this paper we analyze the best shot game:1 in a fixed exogenous network of binary
relations, each node (player) may or may not provide a local public good. The best response
for each player is to provide the good if and only if no one of her neighbors is doing so.
In the previous example we have described an equilibrium where each player can take one of
two actions: take or not take the car. Then we have included a possible source of error : the
car may break down and one should pass from action ‘take the car’ to action ‘not take the
car’. Clearly we can also imagine a second type of error, e.g. if a player forgets that someone
offered her/him a lift and takes her/his own car anyway. We think however that there are
situations in which the first type of error is the only plausible one, as well as there can be
cases in which the opposite is true, and finally cases where the two are both likely, possibly
with different probabilities.
What we want to investigate in the present paper is how the likelihood of different kinds
of error may influence the likelihood of different Nash Equilibria. Formally, we will analyze
stochastic stability (Young, 1998) of the Nash equilibria of the best shot game, under different
assumptions on the perturbed Markov chain that allows the agents to make errors.
What we find is that, if only errors of the type described in the example are possible,
that is players can only make a mistake by not providing the public good even if that is their
best response in equilibrium, then the only stochastically stable Nash equilibria are those
that maximize the number of contributors. If instead the other type of error (i.e. provide the
good even if it is a dominant action to free ride) is the only one admitted, or it is admitted
with a relatively high probability, then every Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable.
The best shot game is very similar to the local public goods game of Bramoullé and
Kranton (2007): they motivate their model with a story of neighborhood farmers, with
1

This name for exactly the same game comes from Galeotti et al. (2010), but it stems back to the
non–network application of Hirshleifer (1983).
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reduced ability to check each others’ technology (this is the network constraint), who can
invest in experimenting a new fertilizer. They assume that the action set of players is
continuous on the non–negative numbers (how much to invest in the new risky fertilizer),
they define stable equilibria as those that survive small perturbations, and they find that
stable equilibria are specialized ones, in which every agent either contributes an optimal
amount (which is the same for all contributors) or free rides, so that their stable equilibria
look like the equilibria of the discrete best shot game.
The main difference between our setup and the one of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
is that in the best shot games that we study actions are discrete, errors, even if rare, are
therefore more dramatic and the concept of stochastic stability naturally applies. We think
that our model, even if stark, offers a valid intuition of why typical problems of congestion
are much more frequently observed in some coordination problems with local externalities.
Most of these problems deal with discrete choices. Traffic is an intuitive and appealing
example,2 while others are given in the introduction of Dall’Asta et al. (2010). In such
complex situations we analyze those equilibria which are more likely to be the outcome of
convergence, under the effect of local positive externalities and the possibility of errors.
In next section we formalize the best shot game. Section 3 describes the general best
response dynamics that we apply to the game. In Section 4 we introduce the possibility of
errors thus obtaining a perturbed dynamics, and we present the main theoretical analysis of
the effects of different perturbation schemes. Finally, a brief discussion is in Section 5.

2

Best Shot Game

We consider a finite set of agents I of cardinality n. Players are linked together in a fixed
exogenous network which is undirected and irreflexive; this network defines the range of a
local externality described below. We represent such network through a n × n symmetric
matrix G with null diagonal, where Gij = 1 means that agents i and j are linked together
(they are called neighbors), while Gij = 0 means that they are not. We indicate with
Ni the set of i’s neighbors (the number of neighbors of a node is called its degree and is
also its number of links). A path between two nodes i and j is an ordered set of nodes
(i, h1 , h2 . . . h` , j) such that Gih1 = 1, Gh1 h2 = 1, . . . , Gh` j = 1. A connected subset J ⊆ I
2

Economic modelling of traffic have shown that simple assumptions can easily lead to congestion, even
when agents are rational and utility maximizers (see Arnott and Small, 1994). Moreover, if we consider the
discretization of the choice space, the motivation for the Logit model of McFadden (1973) were actually the
transport choices of commuting workers.
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is such that, for any i, j ∈ J, there is a path between i and j where all the elements of the
path are members of J. Finally, a subset H ⊆ I is surrounding a subset J ⊆ I if, for any
h ∈ H, we have that h ∈
/ J and there is j ∈ J such that Gjh = 1.
Each player can take one of two actions, xi ∈ {0, 1} with xi denoting i’s action. Action 1
is interpreted as contribution, and an agent i such that xi = 1 is called contributor. Similarly,
action 0 is interpreted as defection, and an agent i such that xi = 0 is called defector.3 We
will consider only pure strategies. A state of the system is represented by a vector x which
specifies each agent’s action, x = (x1 , . . . , xi , . . . , xn ). The set of all states is denoted with
X.
Payoffs are not explicitly specified. We limit ourselves to the class of payoffs that generate
the same type of best reply functions.4 In particular, if we denote with bi agent i’s best reply
function that maps a state of the system into a utility maximizer, then:
(
bi (x) =

1 if xj = 0 for all j ∈ Ni ,
0 otherwise.

(1)

We introduce some further notation in order to simplify the following exposition. We
define the set of satisfied agents at state x as S(x) = {i ∈ I : xi = bi (x)}. Similarly, the set
of unsatisfied agents at state x is U (x) = I \ S(x). We also refer to the set of contributors
as C(x) = {i ∈ I : xi = 1}, and to the set of defectors as D(x) = {i ∈ I : xi = 0}. We also
define intersections of the above sets: the set of satisfied contributors is S C (x) = S(x)∩C(x),
the set of unsatisfied contributors is U C (x) = U (x) ∩ C(x), the set of satisfied defectors is
S D (x) = S(x) ∩ D(x), and the set of unsatisfied defectors is U D (x) = U (x) ∩ D(x). Finally,
given any pair of states (x, x0 ) we indicate with K(x, x0 ) = {i ∈ I : xi = x0i } the set of agents
that keep the same action in both states, and we indicate with M (x, x0 ) = I \ K(x, x0 ) the
set of agents whose action is modified between the states.
The above game is called best shot game. A state x is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the best shot game if and only if S(x) = I and consequently U (x) = ∅. We will call all
3

As will be clear below, we are dealing with a local public good game, so probably free rider would be a
more suitable term than defector. Nevertheless, in the public goods game also “defector” is often used.
4
Note that it would be very easy to define specific payoffs that generate the best reply defined by (1):
imagine that the cost for contributing is c and the value of a contribution, either from an agent herself
and/or from one of her neighbors (players are satiated by one unit of contribution in the neighborhood), is
V > c > 0. There are however many other payoff functions that could have the same best reply function (see
Bramoullé et al. (2010) for other examples). As we consider the whole class we are not entering a discussion
about welfare (i.e. aggregate payoffs – that could differ between the specific cases), but discuss only the issue
of congestion (i.e. the aggregate number of contributors).
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the possible Nash equilibria in pure strategies, given a particular network, as N ⊆ X.
The set N is always non–empty but typically very large. It is an NP–hard problem
to enumerate all the elements of N ,5 and to identify, among them, those that maximize
and minimize the set C(x) of contributors. For extensive discussions on this point see
Dall’Asta et al. (2009) and Dall’Asta et al. (2010). Here we provide two examples, the
second one illustrates how even very homogeneous networks may display a large variability
of contributors in different equilibria.
Example 2. Figure 2 shows two of the three possible Nash equilibria of the same 5–nodes
network, where the five characters of our introductory example have now a different network
of friendships. 

Bob

Dan

Ann

Bob

Dan

Cindy

Eve

Ann

Cindy

Eve

(a)

(b)

Figure 2: Two Nash equilibria for a 5–nodes network. The dark blue stands for contribution,
while the light blue stands for defection.

Example 3. Consider the particular regular random network, of 20 nodes and homogeneous
degree 4, that is shown in Figure 3. The relatively small size of this network allows us to
count all its Nash equilibria. There exist 132 equilibria: 1 with 4 contributors (Figure 3, left),
17 with 5 contributors, 81 with 6 contributors, 32 with 7 contributors, 1 with 8 contributors
(Figure 3, right). 
5

In particular, all maximal independent sets can be found in time O(3n/3 ) for a graph with n vertices
(Tomita et al., 2006).
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Figure 3: Two Nash equilibria for the same regular random network of 20 nodes and degree
4. The dark blue stands for contribution, while the light blue stands for defection. Picture
is obtained by means of the software Pajek (http://pajek.imfm.si/).

3

Unperturbed Dynamics

We imagine a dynamic process in which the network G is kept fixed, while the actions x of
the nodes change.
At each time, which is assumed discrete, every agent best replies to the previous state
of the system with an i.i.d. positive probability β ∈ (0, 1), while with the complementary
probability (1 − β) her action remains the same. If we denote with x the current state and
with x0 the state at next time, we can then formalize as follows:
(
x0i =

bi (x) with i.i.d. probability β ,
xi with i.i.d. probability 1 − β .

(2)

By so doing, a Markov chain (X, T ) turns out to be defined, where X is the finite state
space and T is the transition matrix6 resulting from the individual update process in (2).
We note that T depends on β.
It is easy to check that the Markov chain (X, T ) satisfies the following property, which
formalizes the idea that all and only the unsatisfied agents have the possibility to change
action:7
Txx0 > 0 if and only if M (x, x0 ) ⊆ U (x) .

(3)

Txx0 denotes the probability to pass from state x to state x0 .
It is the generalized property (3) that we exploit in all the following propositions. Our results on the
unperturbed dynamics hold with any transition matrix satisfying that property. Note also that the Markov
chain defined in (3), and hence in (2), is aperiodic because, as M (x, x) = ∅ for all x, then Txx > 0 for all x.
6

7

7
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We introduce some terminology from Markov chain theory following Young (1998). A
state x0 is called accessible from a state x if there exists a sequence of states, with x as first
state and x0 as last state, such that the system can move with positive probability from each
state in the sequence to the next state in the sequence. A set E of states is called ergodic
set (or recurrent class) when each state in E is accessible from any other state in E, and no
state out of E is accessible from any state in E. If E is an ergodic set and x ∈ E, then x is
called recurrent. Let R denote the set of all reccurrent states of (X, T ). If {x} is an ergodic
set, then x is called absorbing. Equivalently, x is absorbing when Txx0 = 1. Let A denote the
set of all absorbing states of (X, T ). Clearly, an absorbing state is recurrent, hence A ⊆ R.
In the next two propositions we show that in our setup the set N of Nash equilibria is
equivalent to all and only the absorbing states (Proposition 1), and that there are no other
recurrent states (Proposition 2).
Proposition 1. A = N .
Proof. We prove double inclusion, first we show that N ⊆ A.
Suppose x ∈ N . Since by (3) we have that Txx0 > 0 with x0 6= x only if U (x) 6= ∅, then
Txx0 = 0 for any x0 6= x, hence Txx = 1 and x is absorbing.
Now we show that A ⊆ N .
By contradiction, suppose x ∈
/ N . Then U (x) 6= ∅. Consider a state x0 where x0i = xi if
i ∈ S(x), and x0i 6= xi otherwise. We have that x0 6= x and, by (3), that Txx0 > 0, hence
Txx < 1 and x is not absorbing.
Proposition 2. A = R.
Proof. The first inclusion A ⊆ R follows from the definitions of A and R.
Now we show that R ⊆ A.
We prove that every element x which is not in A is also not in R. Suppose that x ∈
/ A. We
identify, by means of a recursive algorithm, a state x̂ such that x̂ is accessible from x, but x
is not accessible from x̂. This implies that x ∈
/ R.
By Proposition 1 we know that A = N . Then x ∈
/ N and we have that U (x) 6= ∅. If
C
0
U (x) 6= ∅, we define x ≡ x and we go to Step 1, otherwise we jump to Step 2.
Step 1. We take i ∈ U C (x0 ) and we define state x00 such that x00i ≡ 0 6= x0i = 1 and
x00j ≡ x0j for all j 6= i.
Note that ||U C (x00 )|| < ||U C (x0 )||. This is because of two reasons: first of all, i ∈ U C (x0 ) and
i∈
/ U C (x00 ); the second is that U C (x00 ) ⊆ U C (x0 ), otherwise two neighbors contribute in x00
and do not contribute in U C (x0 ), but that is not possible because C(x00 ) ⊂ C(x0 ). Moreover,
8
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by (3) we have that Tx0 x00 > 0.
We redefine x0 ≡ x00 . Then, if U C (x0 ) = ∅ we pass to Step 2, otherwise we repeat Step 1.
Step 2. We know that U C (x0 ) = ∅. We take i ∈ U D (x̂) and we define state x00 such that
x00i ≡ 1 6= x0i = 0 and x00j ≡ x0j for all j 6= i.
Note that ||U D (x00 )|| < ||U D (x0 )||. This is because of two reasons: first of all, i ∈ U D (x0 ) and
i∈
/ U D (x00 ); the second is that U D (x00 ) ⊆ U D (x0 ), otherwise two neighbors do not contribute
in x00 and do contribute in U C (x0 ), but that is not possible because D(x00 ) ⊂ D(x0 ).
We also note that still U C (x00 ) = U C (x0 ) = ∅, since only i has become contributor and all i’s
neighbors are defectors.
By (3) we have that Tx0 x00 > 0. Finally, if U D (x00 ) 6= ∅ we redefine x0 ≡ x00 and repeat Step
2, otherwise it means that x̂ = x00 and we have reached the goal of the algorithm.
The sequence of states we have constructed shows that x̂ is accessible from x.
Since U (x0 ) = ∅, we have that Tx̂x̂ = 1 by (3), and hence x is not accessible from x0 .
An immediate corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 is that R = A = N .
Bob

Dan

Cindy

Eve

Ann

(c)

Figure 4: A non-Nash (non-absorbing) state for the same network of Figure 2. Here Bob
and Cindy are contributing, while Ann, Dan and Eve are not.

Example 4. Consider the network from Figure 2: both states (a) and (b) shown there are
absorbing, as they are Nash equilibria. Consider now the new state (c) on the same network,
shown in Figure 4: the satisfied nodes here are only the defectors Ann, Dan and Eve. Both
states (a) and (b) are accessible from state (c), but through different paths. To reach (a) from
9
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(c), the unsatisfied contributor Cindy should turn to defection, so that Eve would become
(the only) unsatisfied and would be forced to become a contributor. To reach (b) from (c),
both the unsatisfied contributors Bob and Cindy should simultaneously turn to defection,
then all the five nodes would be unsatisfied. If we now turn to contribution exactly Ann,
Dan and Eve, we reach state (b). 
The following Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 adapt the results in Lemma 2 of Dall’Asta et al.
(2010) to our setup, as the dynamics employed there is different from ours. Both of them
play an important role in the analysis of the perturbed dynamics that we develop in Section
4.
Lemma 3 states that if we start from a Nash equilibrium, we impose to an agent i a change
from contribution to defection, and we let the dynamics T operate, then in no way agents
that are neither agent i, nor neighbors of agent i, will ever change their action. In other
words, under the above conditions the best reply dynamics is restricted to the neighborhood
of agent i.
Lemma 3. Suppose x ∈ N and xi = 1. Define x0 such that x0i = 0 and x0j = xj for all j 6= i.
Then, for every state x00 that is accessible from x0 through T we have that if x00j 6= x0j then
either j = i or j ∈ Ni .
Proof. Call J ≡ U (x0 ), J contains i (by assumption) and all and only nodes j ∈ Ni (hence
x0j = 0) such that there exists no k ∈ Nj , such that x0k = 1. Define H ≡ {h ∈ I : h ∈
S(x0 ), ∃j ∈ U (x0 ) such that h ∈ Nj }, that is the set of all satisfied agents that are neighbors
of some unsatisfied agent in x0 . In the topology of the network, J is a connected subset and
H is the surronding set of J, so that any path between any node j ∈ J and k ∈ I \ (J ∪ H)
contains at least a node h ∈ H. Note that for any h ∈ H we have that x0h = 0, and then h
has at least a contributing neighbor k ∈ I \ (J ∪ H). Then h is satisfied independently of the
action of any j ∈ J. As T allows only unsatisfied agents to update their action, this proves
that for any x00 that is accessible from x0 through T , U (x00 ) ⊆ U (x0 ) = J. As J contains
only i and neighbors of i the statement is proven.
Lemma 4 states that if we start from a Nash equilibrium, we impose to an agent i a
change from defection to contribution, and we let the dynamics T operate, then in no way
agents that are neither agent i, nor neighbors of agent i, nor neighbors of neighbors of agent
i, will ever change their action. In other words, under the above conditions the best reply
dynamics is restricted to the neighborhood of neighbors of agent i.

10
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Lemma 4. Suppose x ∈ N and xi = 0. Define x0 such that x0i = 1 and x0j = xj for all j 6= i.
Then, for every state x00 that is accessible from x0 through T we have that if x00j 6= x0j then
either j = i or j ∈ Ni or j ∈ Nk for some k ∈ Ni .
Proof. Call J 0 ≡ U (x0 ), J 0 contains i (by assumption) and all and only nodes j 0 ∈ Ni such
that x0j 0 = 1. Call now J the set of all those nodes j ∈ I such that there exists a node
j 0 ∈ J 0 \ {i} for which j 0 ∈ Nj (hence x0j = 0) and such that there exists no k ∈ Nj \ J 0 , such
that x0k = 1. We can now define, as in the proof of Lemma 3, the subset H ⊆ I surrounding
J. The proof proceeds analogously. As J contains only i and neighbors of neighbors of i the
statement is proven.

4

Perturbed Dynamics

Given the multiplicity of Nash equilibria, we are uncertain about the final outcome of (X, T ),
that depends in part on the initial state and in part on the realizations of the probabilistic passage from states to states. In order to obtain a sharper prediction, which is also
independent of the initial state, we introduce a small amount of perturbations and we use
the techniques developed in economics by Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993), Kandori
et al. (1993). Since the way in which perturbations are modeled has in general important
consequences on the outcome of the perturbed dynamics (see Bergin and Lipman, 1996), we
consider three specific perturbation schemes, each of which has its own interpretation and
may better fit a particular application.
We introduce perturbations by means of a regular perturbed Markov chain (Young, 1993,
see also Ellison, 2000), that is a triple (X, T, (T  )∈(0,¯) ) where (X, T ) is the unperturbed
Markov chain and:
1. (X, T  ) is an ergodic Markov chain, for all  ∈ (0, ¯);
2. lim→0 T  = T ;
3. there exists a resistance function r : X × X → R+ ∪ {∞} such that for all pairs of
states x, x0 ∈ X,


Txx
0
 lim
0
→0 r(x,x0 ) exists and is strictly positive if r(x, x ) < ∞ ;

 T  0 = 0 for sufficiently small 
if r(x, x0 ) = ∞ .
xx

The resistance r(x, x0 ) is part of the definition and can be interpreted informally as the
amount of perturbations required to move the system from x to x0 with a single application
11
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of T  . It defines a weighted directed network between the states in X, where the weight of
the passage from x to x0 is equal to r(x, x0 ). If r(x, x0 ) = 0, then the system can move from
state x directly to state x0 in the unperturbed dynamics, that is Txx0 > 0. If r(x, x0 ) = ∞,
then the system cannot move from x directly to x0 even in the presence of perturbations,

that is Txx
0 = 0 for  sufficiently small.
Even if T and r are defined on all the possible states of X, we can limit our analysis
to the absorbing states only, which are all and only the recurrent ones (Proposition 2).
This technical procedure is illustrated in Young (1998) and simplifies the complexity of the
notation, without loss of generality. Given x, x0 ∈ A, we define r∗ (x, x0 ) as the minimum
sum of the resistances between absorbing states over any path starting in x and ending in
x0 .
Given x ∈ A, an x-tree on A is a subset of A×A that constitutes a tree rooted at x.8 We
denote such x-tree with Fx and the set of all x-trees with Fx . The resistance of an x-tree,
denoted with r∗ (Fx ), is defined to be the sum of the resistances of its edges, that is:
r∗ (Fx ) ≡

X

r∗ (x, x0 ) .

(x,x0 )∈Fx

Finally, the stochastic potential of x is defined to be
ρ(x) ≡ min{r∗ (Fx ) : Fx ∈ Fx } .
A state x is said stochastically stable (Foster and Young, 1990) if ρ(x) = min{ρ(x) : x ∈ A}.
Intuitively, stochastically stable states are those and only those states that the system can
occupy after very long time has elapsed in the presence of very small perturbations.9
We first consider two extreme types of perturbations in Subsections 4.1, 4.2. Then we
address cases that lie in between those extrema in Subsection 4.3.

4.1

Perturbations affect only the agents that are playing action 0

We assume that every agent playing action 0 can be hit by a perturbation which makes her
switch action to 1. Each perturbation occurs with an i.i.d. positive probability  ∈ (0, 1).
No agent playing action 1 can be hit by a perturbation. We define a transition matrix P 0,
– that we call perturbation matrix – starting from individual probabilities, in the same way
8

By tree we will refer only to this structure between absorbing states, and in no way to the topology of
the underlying exogenous undirected network on which the best shot game is played.
9
For a formal statement see Young (1993).
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as we defined T from (2). We indicate with x the state prior to perturbations and with x0
the resulting state:

x0i

=



 (



xi

if xi = 1 ,

1 with i.i.d. probability  ,
0 with i.i.d. probability 1 − 

if xi = 0 .

(4)

The perturbation matrix P 0, collects the probabilities to move between any two states in
X when the individual perturbation process is as in (4). We assume our perturbed Markov
chain to be such that first T applies and then errors can occur through P 0, . We now check
that (X, T, (T 0, )∈(0,¯) ), with T 0, = P 0, T , is indeed a regular perturbed Markov chain.10
1. (X, T 0, ) is ergodic for all positive : this can be seen applying the last sufficient
condition for ergodicity in Fudenberg and Levine (1998, appendix of Chapter 5), once
we take into account that i) A = R by Proposition 2, and ii) r∗ (x, x0 ) < ∞ for all
x, x0 ∈ A by the following Lemma 5.
2. lim→0 T 0, = T , since lim→0 P 0, is equal to the identity matrix.
3. The resistance function11 is
(
||S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 )|| if S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) = ∅
r0 (x, x0 ) =
∞
otherwise

(5)

In fact,
(a) if r0 (x, x0 ) = ∞, then S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) 6= ∅ and there is no way to go from x
to x0 , since no satisfied agent can change in the unperturbed dynamics and no

contributor can be hit by a perturbation, hence Txx
0 = 0 for every ;
0

0,
r(x,x )
(b) if r0 (x, x0 ) < ∞, then Txx
, when  approaches zero;
0 has the same order of 
0
in fact, the agents in U (x) ∩ M (x, x ) can change independently with probability
β when T is applied, the agents in S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) can change independently
10

We follow Samuelson (1997) when we derive the perturbed transition matrix T 0, by post-multiplying
the unperturbed transition matrix T with the perturbations matrix P 0, . If we exchange the order in the
matrix multiplication some details should change (since matrix multiplication is not commutative), but all
our results would still hold (as we iterate T 0, and matrix multiplication is associative).
11
The necessary assumption for our results is to have a regular perturbed Markov chain whose resistance
function is as in (5). By deriving it from an individual perturbation process (defined in (4)) and from an
individual update process (defined in (2)), we show that there exists at least one significant case satisfying
this property.
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with probability  when P 0, is applied (and only then), and no agent is left since
S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) = ∅.
In the next remark we provide a lower bound for the resistance to move between Nash
equilibria under this perturbation scheme, and we then use such remark in Proposition 6.
Remark 1. When (5) holds, r0∗ (x, x0 ) ≥ 1 for all x, x0 ∈ N .
The following lemma, which is of help in the proof of Proposition 6, shows that under this
perturbation scheme any two absorbing states are connected through a sequence of absorbing
states, with each step in the sequence having resistance 1.
Lemma 5. When (5) holds, for all x, x0 ∈ A, x 6= x0 , there exists a sequence x0 , . . . , xs , . . . , xk ,
with xs ∈ A for 0 ≤ s ≤ k, x0 = x and xk = x0 , such that r0∗ (xs , xs+1 ) = 1 for 0 ≤ s < k.
Proof. Since x 6= x0 , we have that k ≥ 1. We set x0 = x. Suppose xs is an element of the
sequence, and take is ∈ C(x0 ) ∩ D(xs ).
We define state x̃ such that x̃is ≡ 1 6= xsis = 0 and x̃j ≡ xsj for all j 6= is . Note that
r0 (xs , x̃) = 1. We define state x̃0 such that x̃0j ≡ 0 for all j ∈ Nis and x̃0k ≡ x̃k for any
other node k. We define state xs+1 such that xs+1
= bk (x̃0 ) for all k ∈ Nj , j ∈ Nis , and
k
xs+1
≡ x̃0` for any other node `. By Lemma 4 and Proposition 1, xs+1 ∈ A. We note that
`
xs+1 is obtained from x̃ applying only the unperturbed dynamics T , hence the resistance
r0∗ (xs , xs+1 ) = 1.
Note that, since is ∈
/ D(xs+1 ) and (j ∈ Nis ⇒ j ∈ D(x0 )), then neither node is nor any
of her neigbors is in the set C(x0 ) ∩ D(xt ), for all t ≥ s + 1. As the network is finite, this
sequence reaches x0 in a finite number k of steps.
Next proposition provides a characterization of stochastically stable states under (5). We
use a known result by Samuelson (1994) to obtain stochastic stability from single-mutation
connected neighborhoods of absorbing sets.
Proposition 6. When (5) holds, a state x is stochastically stable in (X, T, (T 0, )∈(0,¯) ) if
and only if x ∈ N .
Proof. We first show that x ∈ N implies x stochastically stable. Theorem 2 in Samuelson
(1994) implies that if x0 is stochastically stable, x ∈ A, r∗ (x0 , x) is equal to the minimum
resistance between recurrent states, then x is stochastically stable. Since at least one recurrent state must be stochastically stable, Proposition 2 implies that there must exist an
absorbing state x0 that is stochastically stable. For any x ∈ N , if x = x0 we are done. If
14
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x 6= x0 , then by Proposition 1 we can use Lemma 5 to say that there exists a finite sequence
of absorbing states from x0 to x, where the resistance between subsequent states is always
1. Remark 1, together with Propositions 1 and 2, implies that 1 is the minimum resistance
between recurrent states. A repeated application of Theorem 2 in Samuelson (1994) shows
that each state in the sequence is stochastically stable, and in particular the final state x.
It is trivial to show that x stochastically stable implies x ∈ N . By contradiction, suppose
x∈
/ N . Then, by Propositions 1 and 2, x ∈
/ R, and hence cannot be stochastically stable.
Proposition 6 tells us that, under the perturbation scheme considered in this subsection,
stochastic stability turns out to be ineffective in selecting among equilibria.

4.2

Perturbations affect only the agents that are playing action 1

Now we assume that every agent playing action 1 is hit by an i.i.d. perturbation with probability  ∈ (0, 1), while no agent playing action 0 is susceptible to perturbations. Again
we indicate with x the state prior to perturbations and with x0 the resulting state, and we
formalize the individual perturbation process as follows:

x0i

=



 (



xi

if xi = 0 ,

0 with i.i.d. probability  ,
1 with i.i.d. probability 1 − 

if xi = 1 .

(6)

We denote with P 1, the perturbations matrix resulting from (6). We check that (X, T, (T 1, )∈(0,¯) ),
with T 1, = P 1, T , is indeed a regular perturbed Markov chain.
1. (X, T 1, ) is ergodic for all positive  by the same argument of the corresponding point
in the previous Subsection 4.1, once we replace Lemma 5 with Lemma 7.
2. lim→0 T 1, = T , since lim→0 P 1, is equal to the identity matrix.
3. The resistance function is
(
r1 (x, x0 ) =

||S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 )|| if S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) = ∅
∞
otherwise

(7)

In fact, analogously to what happens for Subsection 4.1,
(a) if r1 (x, x0 ) = ∞, then S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) 6= ∅ and there is no way to go from x
to x0 , since no satisfied agent can change in the unperturbed dynamics and no

defector can be hit by a perturbation, hence Txx
0 = 0 for every ;
15
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0

0,
r(x,x )
(b) if r1 (x, x0 ) < ∞, then Txx
when  approaches zero;
0 has the same order of 
0
in fact, the agents in U (x) ∩ M (x, x ) can change independently with probability
β when T is applied, the agents in S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) can change independently
with probability  when P 1, is applied (and only then), and no agent is left since
S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) = ∅.

This remark plays the same role of Remark 1.
Remark 2. When (7) holds, r1∗ (x, x0 ) ≥ 1 for all x, x0 ∈ N .
The following lemma shows that the resistance between any two absorbing states is equal
to the number of contributors that must change to defection. This result is less trivial than
it might appear: it shows that there is no possibility that by changing only some of the
contributors to defectors, the remaining ones are induced to change by the unperturbed
dynamics. The lemma could be proven directly from Lemma 3, but we find more intuitive
the argument below.
Lemma 7. When (7) holds, for all x, x0 ∈ A, r1∗ (x, x0 ) = ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||.
Proof. We first show that r1∗ (x, x0 ) ≥ ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||. By contradiction, suppose r∗ (x, x0 ) <
||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||. Then, some i ∈ C(x) ∩ D(x0 ) must switch from contribution to defection
along a path from x to x0 by best reply to the previous state. This requires that in the
previous state there must exist some j ∈ Ni that contributes. However, j ∈ D(x) and j
can never change to contribution as long as i is a contributor, neither by best reply nor by
perturbation when (7) holds.
We now show that r1∗ (x, x0 ) ≤ ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||. Define state x̃ such that x̃i ≡ 0 6= xi = 1
for all i ∈ C(x) ∩ D(x0 ), and x̃i ≡ xi otherwise. Note that r(x, x̃) = ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||. Note
also that bi (x̃) = 1 for all i ∈ C(x0 ) ∩ D(x̃). This means that r(x̃, x0 ) = 0, and therefore
r∗ (x, x0 ) ≤ r(x, x̃) + r(x̃, x0 ) = ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||.
We now use Lemma 7 to relate algebraically the resistance to move from x to x0 to the
resistance to come back from x0 to x.
Lemma 8. When (7) holds, for all x, x0 ∈ A, r∗ (x, x0 ) = r∗ (x0 , x) + ||C(x)|| − ||C(x0 )||.
Proof. From Lemma 7 we know that r∗ (x, x0 ) = ||C(x)∩D(x0 )||. Note that ||C(x)∩D(x0 )|| =
||C(x)|| − ||C(x) ∩ C(x0 )||. Always from Lemma 7 we also know that r∗ (x, x0 ) = ||C(x0 ) ∩
D(x)|| = ||C(x0 )|| − ||C(x) ∩ C(x0 )||, from which ||C(x) ∩ C(x0 )|| = C(x0 ) − r∗ (x0 , x), which
substituted in the former equality gives the desired result.
16
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper512

16

Boncinelli and Pin: Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game

We are now ready to provide a characterization of stochastically stable states under (7).
Proposition 9. When (7) holds, a state x is stochastically stable in (X, T, (T 1, )∈(0,¯) ) if
and only if x ∈ arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )||.
Proof. We first prove that only a state in arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )|| may be stochastically stable.
Ad absurdum, suppose ||C(x)|| ∈
/ arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )|| and x is stochastically stable. There
must exist x0 such that ||C(x0 )|| > ||C(x)||. Take an x-tree Fx . Consider the path in Fx
going from x0 to x, that is the unique {(x0 , x1 ), . . . , (xk−1 , xk )} such that x0 = x0 , xk = x,
and (xi , xi+1 ) ∈ Fx for all i ∈ {0, k − 1}. We now modify Fx by reverting the path from x0
to x, so we define Fx0 ≡ (Fx \ {(xi , xi+1 ) : i ∈ {0, k − 1}}) ∪ {(xi+1 , xi ) : i ∈ {0, k − 1}},
P
∗
i
i+1
)+
which is indeed an x0 -tree. It is straightforward that r1∗ (Fx0 ) = r1∗ (Fx ) − k−1
i=0 r1 (x , x
P
Pk−1 ∗ i+1 i
k−1
i+1
∗
∗
, x ). Applying Lemma 8 we obtain r1 (Fx0 ) = r1 (Fx ) + i=0 (||C(x )|| −
i=0 r1 (x
i
||C(x )||), that simplifies to r1∗ (Fx0 ) = r∗ (Fx ) + ||C(x)|| − ||C(x0 )||. Since ||C(x0 )|| > ||C(x)||,
then r1∗ (Fx0 ) < r1∗ (Fx ). In terms of stochastic potentials, this implies that ρ(x0 ) < ρ(x),
against the hypothesis that x is stochastically stable.
We now prove that any state in arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )|| is stochastically stable. Since
at least one stochastically stable state must exist, from the above argument we conclude
that there exists x ∈ arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )|| that is stochastically stable. Take any other
x0 ∈ arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )||. Following exactly the same reasoning as above we obtain that
ρ(x0 ) = ρ(x). Since ρ(x) is a minimum, ρ(x0 ) is a minimum too, and x0 is hence stochastically
stable.
Previous proposition is the main point of this work: it provides a characterization of
stochastically stable equilibria which is much more refined than the one obtained in Proposition 6. Next section analyzes the stability of this result, and generalizes to a wider class of
possible sources of errors.

4.3

Perturbations affect all agents

We have obtained different results about stochastic stability in the extreme cases when
perturbations hit exclusively agents playing either contribution or defection. We are now
interested in understanding what happens when we allow both types of perturbation. In
particular, we assume that every agent playing action 1 is hit by an i.i.d. perturbation
with probability  ∈ (0, 1), and every agent playing action 0 is hit by an i.i.d. perturbation
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m , where m is a positive real number.12 Formally, with x denoting the state prior to
perturbations and x0 the resulting state:

x0i =

 (

1 with i.i.d. probability m ,




0 with i.i.d. probability 1 − m



if xi = 0 ,

(



0 with i.i.d. probability  ,




1 with i.i.d. probability 1 − 

if xi = 1 .

(8)

We denote with P m, the perturbations matrix resulting from (8).
We check that (X, T, (T m, )∈(0,¯) ), with T m, = P m, T , is indeed a regular perturbed
Markov chain.
1. (X, T m, ) is ergodic because if a state x0 is accessible from a state x in (X, T 0, ) or in
(X, T 1, ), then the same is true in (X, T m, ).
2. lim→0 T m, = T , since lim→0 P m, is equal to the identity matrix.
3. The resistance function is
rm (x, x0 ) = ||S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 )|| + m||S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 )||

(9)

In fact, the agents in U (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) can change independently with probability β
when T is applied; the agents in S C (x) ∩ M (x, x0 ) can change independently with
probability  when P m, is applied (and only then); and the agents in S D (x) ∩ M (x, x0 )
can change independently with probability m when P m, is applied (and only then).
The usual kind of remark sets a lower bound to the resistance between any two absorbing
states.
∗
Remark 3. When (9) holds, rm
(x, x0 ) ≥ min{1, m} for all x, x0 ∈ N .

We are ready for the last result: what happens when all agents are affected by perturbations.
Proposition 10. When (9) holds:
12

We might have used η m0 for the probability that a perturbation hits a defector and η m1 for the probability
that a perturbation hits a contributor. Here we adopt, without loss of generality, the normalization that
 ≡ η m0 and m ≡ m1 /m0 .
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1. if m ≤ 1, then a state x is stochastically stable in (X, T, (T k, )∈(0,¯) ) if and only if
x ∈ N;
2. if m ≥ maxi∈I {||Ni ||}, then a state x is stochastically stable in (X, T, (T m, )∈(0,¯) ) if
and only if x ∈ arg maxx0 ∈N ||C(x0 )||.
Proof. Suppose m ≤ 1. Following the proof of Lemma 5, we obtain that when (9) holds, for
all x, x0 ∈ A, x 6= x0 , there exists a sequence x0 , . . . , xs , . . . , xk , with xs ∈ A for 0 ≤ s ≤ k,
x0 = x and xk = x0 , such that r∗ (xs , xs+1 ) = m for 0 ≤ s < k. This result and Remark
3 allow us to follow the proof of Proposition 6 and use m instead of 1, obtaining the same
result as in Proposition 6.
Suppose now that m ≥ maxi∈I {||Ni ||}. We show that the resistances are the same as in
∗
Subsection 4.2, i.e., for all x, x0 ∈ A, rm
(x, x0 ) = ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||. Therefore Lemma 8 and
Proposition 10 apply here too, and the result is obtained.
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 imply that there is only one way to change the agents in C(x) ∩
D(x0 ) from contribution to defection, other than letting each of those agents be hit by a
perturbation. This way is to let some neighbors of all the agents in C(x) ∩ D(x0 ) be hit
by a perturbation changing their action from defection to contribution. This amounts to
having at least ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||/ maxi∈I {||Ni |} perturbations, each of which costs m. Since
m ≥ maxi∈I {||Ni |} by assumption, this way of reaching x0 from x has at least a cost of
∗
(x, x0 ) = ||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||.
||C(x) ∩ D(x0 )||. This shows that rm
In the next examples we give the stochastically stable sets of the game, for the whole
range of values of m, for a very simple network. Even if the example is simple, it may give
a hint on the complexity of situations that may arise in general, for values of m between 1
and maxi∈I {||Ni ||}.
Example 5. Consider the network from introductory Figure 1. This network has two Nash
equilibria, one in which the two peripheral nodes Ann and Eve contribute (call it N E2 ),
another one in which the three central nodes Bob, Cindy and Dan do so (call it N E3 ).
Imagine that we want to find the stochastically stable equilibria deriving from (8), and
hence (9), as  → 0.
To pass from N E2 to N E3 we need that at least one of the central nodes starts contributing
(with probability m ) or both Ann and Eve stop contributing (with probability 2 ). This
event happens with a probability of order min{m, 2}, this number is the resistance from N E2
to N E3 . To pass from N E3 to N E3 we need that at least one between Ann and Eve starts
contributing (with probability m ) or altogether Bob, Cindy and Eve stop contributing (with
probability 3 ). This event happens with a probability of order min{m, 3}, the resistance
19
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from N E3 to N E2 .
Summing up, the two equilibria are both stochastically stable if m ≤ 2, as in this case the
two resistances are equal. If instead m > 2, then only N E3 is stochastically stable, as the
resistance from N E3 to N E2 is min{m, 3}, while the one from N E2 to N E3 is 2. 

5

Discussion

The best shot game is a very stark model, and clearly misses the details of any specific
real–world situation. We think however that, as the model in Schelling (1969) has done for
the issue of residential segregation, this model is able to describe the backbone structure of
incentives in many problems of local contribution, as discussed in the introduction. The best
shot game has multiple equilibria, so a refinement is needed to understand which outcomes
are likely to emerge.
As we deal with discrete actions, the natural candidate for selection is stochastic stability:
it selects the equilibria that are more likely to be observed in the long run, in the presence
of small errors occurring with a vanishing probability. It is well known (Bergin and Lipman,
1996) that different equilibria can be selected depending on the assumptions on the relative
likelihood of different types of errors, as indeed it occurs in our model (see the detailed
discussion in Section 4). Blume (2003) focuses on finding sufficient conditions for the errors,
in a perturbed dynamic on a discrete action space, such that stability gives always the same
prediction. This dependence of stochastically stable states on the type of perturbations
is often interpreted as a limitation of the predictive efficacy of stochastic stability, since
essentially any equilibrium can be selected by means of stochastic stability with proper
assumptions on the errors. We think instead that what enriches the analysis is exactly this
dependence of the selected equilibria on the nature of errors. Our model is in principle very
general, but if we try to apply it to a particular situation, it can adapt itself to the object
of analysis and give specific predictions (as has been done, for a very different model, by
Ben-Shoham et al., 2004). In particular, we derive interesting results for the case in which
errors that stop contribution are much more frequent than errors that make contribution
arise. We think that this is a property of many real–world situations in which the action of
contributing involves much more individual effort than the action of non contributing, but
also requires some external factor to be carried out (such as a car in order to give a lift).
However, such an external factor may accidentally be damaged (e.g. a car engine may break
down). The counter–intuitive result is that, exactly in those cases, the selected equilibrium
will be the one with highest congestion, i.e. the number of contributors is the highest among
20
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equilibria.13
We leave for future research the analysis of more general models of network games, in
which the effort of a player is substitute to the effort of her neighbors (for a formal definition
see Galeotti et al., 2010). This is clearly the case of the best shot game, but possibly some
of the results achieved in this paper could be generalized. Bramoullé et al. (2010) consider
a particular class of games in which actions are continuous and neighbors’ efforts are linear
substitutes, and they analyze asymptotic stability as defined in Weibull (1995). It would be
interesting, in more general games with a discrete strategy space, to compare and possibly
generalize their findings with the results that we obtain for stochastic stability.
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